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ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with a problem that arises within ethical 
frameworks that imply that it is wrong for humans to consume meat 
or other animal products when vegan alternatives are available. The 
specific problem relates to the ethical difficulties associated with be-
ginning a relationship with a companion animal that may require 
at least some animal-based foods in order to survive. I follow some 
psychologists in referring to the ethical problems associated with 
such companionship as the Vegetarian’s Dilemma. After approach-
ing this dilemma from the perspective the animal rights approach 
and welfarist consequentialism, I argue that some important insights 
can be gained by viewing this dilemma through a virtue ethical lens. 
In particular, I point out the ethical significance of the fact that the 
very same virtues that might lead one to adopt a vegan lifestyle may 
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In my own experience, a surprising number of ethical vegans 
or vegetarians have carnivorous animal companions. In fact, it 
is not uncommon to hear people report that their first shifts 
towards veganism were initially inspired by their personal rela-
tionship with a nonhuman such as a dog or a cat. Some animal 
rights theorists, such as Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, 
report similar experiences: “for some people the route to [ethi-
cal veganism] is an intellectual process, but for many others, it 
comes (if at all) through relationships with individual animals” 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 23-24). 
In this paper, I am concerned with a common perceived in-
consistency (or, as some may put it, a hypocrisy) in a large 
subsection of the ethical vegan and vegetarian community. 
The charge of hypocrisy comes from the observation that in 
order to maintain a companionship relationship with carnivo-
rous companions, one must acquire animal-based foods for the 
companions in question. This means that many ethical vegetar-
ians and vegans find themselves endorsing the following two 
commitments, which, when combined, seem to generate a kind 
of inconsistency: 1) It is wrong to kill animals for food, and 
2) It is permissible to continue to participate in the killing of 
animals for food in order to support a nonhuman companion. 
The tension between these two statements has been referred to 
as the Vegetarian’s Dilemma (Rothberger 2014).
In order to fully explore this dilemma, I will begin with two 
assumptions: First, I will assume (without argument) that there 
are good reasons to believe that some form of ethical veganism 
(the view that it is prima facie wrong for humans in developed 
countries to consume animal products, wear animal products, 
or otherwise support industries that rely on animal products) 
is correct. I take this for granted because it is only under this 
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assumption that the problems associated with carnivorous 
companionship can be raised. In other words, the problem I 
am concerned with only arises within ethical frameworks that 
imply some version of the claim that it is generally wrong to 
consume animal products. 
Second, I will assume that the health of at least some com-
mon carnivorous companions is contingent upon access to ani-
mal-derived foods that, practically speaking, must be acquired 
by farming and slaughtering sentient animals. It should be 
noted that I am not here attempting to establish this empirical 
claim. It may well be that this assumption will be proven false, 
as I have heard many anecdotal accounts of cats (for example) 
that live healthy lives on a vegan or mostly-vegan diet. None-
theless, it is worth considering what, ethically speaking, would 
follow from its truth, as its truth is not out of the question. I 
have personally heard many anecdotal reports from veterinar-
ians and others who claim that there are serious risks for vegan 
cats. Additionally, there are several frequently cited studies 
that raise concerns about the nutritional adequacy of commer-
cially available vegan cat foods (Gray, Sellon, and Freeman 
2005; Kanakubo, Fascetti, and Larsen 2015).1 Finally, social 
scientists who have researched vegetarians with carnivorous 
companions have found that the belief that a vegan diet can be 
harmful to cats is very widespread, even among strict ethical 
vegans (Rothberger 2014). Because this belief is widespread 
and has some empirical support, it is philosophically interest-
ing to inquire into what would follow from its truth.
Once again, I am not here attempting to fully defend either 
of these assumptions, as doing so would take me well beyond 
1 See Gray et al. 2005 and Kanakubo et al. 2015 for a discussion of the prob-
lems with vegan cat food alternatives.
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the scope of this paper. Rather, I am granting them in order to 
investigate what would follow from their truth. 
The first point that must be observed about the Vegetarian’s 
Dilemma is that the two most common defenses of ethical veg-
anism (welfarist consequentialism and the animal rights ap-
proach) seem to categorically deny that it is justifiable to kill 
farmed animals in order to feed a companion animal. 
For example, the well-known proponent of animal rights 
Tom Regan explicitly says that “when we must choose between 
overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights 
of few who are innocent…then we ought to choose to override 
the rights of the few in preference to overriding the rights of 
the many” (Regan 1983, 305). This ‘miniride’ principle clearly 
implies that we should override the rights of a single cat rather 
than the many animals that must be killed to sustain it over the 
course of its life. 
When addressing this very issue, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
ask the following: “…what if it turns out some cats simply can-
not be adequately nourished without animal protein in their 
diet? How could we fulfill our duty to feed our cats without 
violating the rights of other animals not to be killed?” (Don-
aldson and Kymlicka 2011, 150). As is obvious from this quota-
tion, they believe that the animal rights position implies that 
killing animals, and thus violating their rights, in order to feed 
a carnivorous companion is not an ethically acceptable option. 
While they stop short of explicitly recommending the aboli-
tion of carnivorous companions, they close this discussion with 
the following ominous questions: “Does this level of restriction 
undermine the possibility of cats being flourishing members 
of mixed society? Does it mean that we would be justified in 
Patrick J. Clipsham
6
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
bringing about their extinction?” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011, 152). They do not explicitly answer these questions, but 
the mere fact that they are stated in this format suggests that, 
on an animal rights perspective, abolition of carnivorous com-
panionship may be morally required.  
Consider also welfarist consequentialism. This is the fam-
ily of views that establish an obligation to refrain from animal 
products because of the moral significance of the suffering, 
happiness, or preferences of nonhuman animals (McPherson 
2014, Norcross 2004, Singer 1995). According to most forms of 
welfarist consequentialism, causing suffering or acting against 
the preferences of nonhuman animals is wrong unless there are 
strong reasons that override their preferences or suffering. On 
such a consequentialist framework, the life of one animal (the 
carnivorous companion) is clearly outweighed by the lives of 
the numerous animals that would have to be killed in order to 
sustain it. 
Does this mean that all defenders of ethical veganism must 
categorically reject carnivorous companionship? In what fol-
lows, I will show that a virtue-based approach to this question 
yields very different results. While the existence of this third 
position does not undermine the ethical insights of the rights-
based or welfarist positions, it does point to some plausible 
considerations that are ignored by the other two perspectives 
mentioned above. I now turn to an introduction of some of the 
most prominent virtue-based accounts of animal ethics. 
Virtue Approaches to Animal Ethics
Rosalind Hursthouse argues that our deliberations about an-
imal ethics ought to focus on the following question: which of 
our practices regarding animals express virtuous dispositions, 
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and which express vicious dispositions? This approach is most 
clearly explained in the following application of it to the suffer-
ing that occurs as a result of animal agriculture: 
Can I, in all honesty, deny the ongoing existence of 
this suffering? No, I can’t. I know perfectly well that 
although there have been some improvements in the 
regulation of factory farming, what is going on is 
still terrible. Can I think it is anything but callous to 
shrug this off and say it doesn’t matter? No, I can’t. 
Can I deny that the practices are cruel? No, I can’t. 
Then what am I doing being party to them? It won’t 
do for me to say that I am not actually engaging in the 
cruelty myself. There is a large gap between not being 
cruel and being truly compassionate, and the virtue of 
compassion is what I am supposed to be acquiring and 
exercising. (Hursthouse 2006, 142) 
The most important feature of Hursthouse’s framework is 
that it answers ethical questions about a particular practice by 
asking what virtues or vices are likely to be expressed by an 
individual who engages in said practice. By doing so, we can 
determine whether or not the practice in question is one that 
“the virtuous, as such, go in for (or ideally, would go in for)” 
(Hurthouse 2006, 141). For the duration of this paper, I will 
use the construction “X expresses the virtue Y” as a way of 
communicating that the individual who has the virtue Y would 
likely choose the action X.
Other philosophers have recognized that a virtue ethical ap-
proach to animal ethics can often help us answer difficult ethi-
cal questions. Garrett Merriam, for example, uses this method 
as a means of more carefully walking the “moral tightrope” 
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associated with the ethics of using animals in biomedical ex-
perimentation (Merriam 2012, 126). He prefers a virtue ethical 
approach in this context because it, “more so than any other 
ethical theory, is capable of recognizing the moral vagueness 
and ambiguity raised by this issue” (ibid). In a spirit similar to 
Merriam’s, I will apply the insights of virtue ethics to the case 
of carnivorous companionship in the hopes of teasing out some 
ethical nuances that are ignored by other perspectives. 
The first step towards using a virtue ethical framework to 
approach the issue of carnivorous companionship is to deter-
mine which virtues and vices are most relevant. What disposi-
tions of character are likely to be expressed by someone who 
chooses to, or chooses not to, keep a carnivorous companion, 
and which of those should play a substantial role in our ethical 
theorizing about carnivorous companionship?  
Despite the fact that some spheres of human behavior and 
interaction (such as those associated with the virtues of tactful-
ness, discretion, and humor), do not have analogues in most re-
lationships between humans and animals, a number of spheres 
of human experience, as well as their associated virtues and 
vices, do. 
The first set of relevant virtues are strongly suggested by 
Hursthouse’s comments (quoted above): sympathy and com-
passion. These are behavioral dispositions that any truly vir-
tuous person would express to an appropriate degree in their 
interactions with both humans and animals. Similarly, it seems 
unproblematic to claim that the vices associated with these 
spheres of human behavior (such as callousness or indiffer-
ence) would never be expressed in the actions of the virtuous 
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individual, irrespective of whether their actions are directed at 
a human or a nonhuman animal. 
This first category of virtues and vices (sympathy/compas-
sion as well as callousness/indifference) are likely to be the 
most important when considering questions regarding carnivo-
rous companionship.  This is because we can plausibly under-
stand the choice to maintain a carnivorous companion as being 
both in line with these virtues (as it involves concern and care 
for another being), but also as problematically callous (as it may 
also involve a lack of compassion for the animals upon which 
the carnivorous companion will feed). Since these behavioral 
dispositions play such an important role in the context of virtue 
ethical defences of veganism, they will play a similarly central 
role in the following analysis. 
A second virtue that may be relevant is that of being just. I 
follow Martha Nussbaum in understanding the sphere of hu-
man experience pertaining to the “distribution of limited re-
sources” as relating to the virtue of justice (Nussbaum 1988, 
37). Since the assumptions I laid out in earlier sections of this 
paper characterize carnivorous companionship as necessarily 
involving meeting the needs of one individual (the carnivorous 
companion) by imposing a burden on another (by killing it and 
transforming its body into food for the companion), decisions 
about carnivorous companionship inherently involve making 
judgments about the benefits and burdens that may result from 
the distribution of resources. In other words, there are many 
ways that actions related to carnivorous companions can ex-
press the character traits of justice or injustice. 
 Third, it is worth mentioning that courage and cow-
ardice are also relevant to a virtue ethical account of carnivo-
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rous companionship. There are a number of ways that someone 
could exhibit the vice of cowardice when trying to decide how 
to deal with a carnivorous animal. Simply allowing someone 
else to deal with the animal without exhibiting appropriate 
concern for the future well-being of the carnivore involves an 
unwillingness to take on responsibility and a reticence to face 
a potentially difficult ethical decision. Alternatively, taking on 
this responsibility for oneself may involve facing uncomfort-
able ethical questions, negotiating a number of dilemmas, and 
engaging in a number of practices which may have question-
able ethical implications. As Donaldson and Kymlicka put it,
…any individual contemplating having a companion 
cat is signing on for a great deal of responsibility in 
terms of doing the work to ensure their cat flourishes 
under the necessary restrictions (e.g., efforts to find 
palatable and nutritionally appropriate foods for them, 
and to create opportunities for them to enjoy the out-
doors while not endangering others)” (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, 153). 
In short, there are a number of ways that choices made with 
respect to a carnivorous companion can exhibit the virtue of 
courage or the vice of cowardice. 
While many other virtues, vices, and character traits might 
be relevant to the question of carnivorous companions, these 
three can provide enough of a framework for us to start to un-
derstand and assess the alternatives that are open to an indi-
vidual who is considering adopting such a companion.
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The Case of the Lycanthropic Human
Now that we have the philosophical resources of a virtue-
based approach to animal ethics at our disposal, we can begin 
to determine which virtues and vices would be expressed by 
an individual who chooses to enter into the kind of relationship 
that is typical of carnivorous companionship. 
I begin by introducing a fictional case that makes the struc-
ture of carnivorous companionship relationships clear, but that 
makes reference only to the members of a single species. In this 
example, the caregiver, the companion, and the animals used 
for food will all be human. My reason for using this example 
rather than the more realistic example of adopting a cat stems 
from my concern that it may be easy to draw on biased intu-
itions against the moral status of nonhuman animals in order to 
justify carnivorous companionship. My example is designed to 
neutralize those biased intuitions. The challenge to carnivorous 
companionship involves pointing out that such companionship 
requires killing a number of beings with full moral status in 
order to sustain another being with equal moral status, and this 
feature is best exemplified by considering a case that is struc-
turally similar to carnivorous companionship, but involves in-
dividuals who are uncontroversially of the same moral status. 
Without further introduction, the case I wish to discuss is 
as follows: 
A human has contracted a disease (lycanthropy) which 
makes him irrational, incapable of speech, violent, 
unpredictable, and easily distracted. He also seems to 
have an insatiable desire for the taste of human flesh. 
Furthermore, after running several tests, you have 
decisive scientific evidence that his continued health 
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depends on his regular consumption of human flesh 
(other animal flesh does not contain all the compounds 
necessary to maintain the lycanthropes’ health). If the 
authorities learned of his existence and you did not 
intervene, he would be imprisoned and subsequently 
either euthanized or allowed to slowly die of malnu-
trition. The unpredictable violence of this human sug-
gests that if you simply released him, he would regu-
larly feed on weaker humans and, due to his seeming 
willingness to entertain himself with violence, would 
likely kill far more humans than is necessary to sus-
tain him. Despite these features, the lycanthropic hu-
man is capable of developing close relationships with 
some humans and experiences the full range of human 
desires, pleasures, and emotions. He is, to some extent, 
capable of understanding his predicament and demon-
strates awareness of, and concern about, his future. 
The following four choices arguably exhaust the plausible 
options that are available to someone who has encountered this 
lycanthropic human:
Option 1: Painlessly kill the lycanthrope or turn it over 
to someone who will do so.
Option 2: Release the lycanthropic human to fend for 
itself.
Option 3: Adopt the human and care for it by occasion-
ally selecting, abducting, and killing humans in order 
to feed it (or retaining a reliable, humane assassin to do 
so for you). 
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Option 4: Find someone else (either another human or 
an organization) who will care for the lycanthrope and 
feed it human flesh.
It is worth mentioning that there is a fifth option that I have 
chosen to exclude: feeding the lycanthrope human flesh that is 
harvested from humans that have died from natural causes or 
accidents. I ignore it because it would not be a viable option 
for someone considering the adoption of a cat or other carni-
vore. Even if it were possible to coordinate large-scale efforts 
to discover, gather, and process the corpses of animals that 
died naturally into ethically-sourced cat food, such an institu-
tion does not currently exist in our society and likely will not 
exist any time soon. Since there is good reason to think that the 
Vegetarian’s Dilemma cannot be resolved by this fifth option, 
I will ignore it and focus on the four options that seem to be 
analogous to the options that are practically available to anyone 
considering the adoption of a cat. I now turn to a discussion of 
what welfarism, the animal rights approach, and virtue ethics 
would say about these four options in the case of the lycan-
thropic human. 
Welfarist theories would choose the option that minimiz-
es suffering and limits the number of people who need to be 
killed. Option 1, which involves painlessly killing the lycan-
thrope, would likely best fulfill those criteria. 
It is more difficult to see how a rights-based approach might 
confront this dilemma. While some rights-based theories that 
are inspired by Kantian philosophy or the distinction between 
Doing and Allowing (such as Quinn 1989) might recommend 
option 2, it seems to me that most versions of the animal rights 
positions, such as those articulated by Donaldson and Kym-
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licka, would likely conclude that option 1 is the correct choice. 
This consequence is implied by the selections from Donaldson 
and Kymlicka’s work that were quoted earlier. Furthermore, 
some aspects of Regan’s view also suggest that he would select 
Option 1. As was mentioned above, Regan endorses the claim 
that when we are in a situation where someone’s rights must be 
violated, we must choose the action that will violate the rights 
of the fewest (Regan 1983, 305). It is plausible to think that all 
four of the options involve violating someone’s rights. Option 1 
involves violating the lycanthrope’s right to life or, if it is sim-
ply restrained until it dies of malnutrition, its right to liberty. 
Option 2 also plausibly involves violating the rights of many 
people, specifically the many extra people that would be killed 
by the loose lycanthrope for entertainment (this would espe-
cially be true if we accept that you violate someone’s rights if 
you expose them to preventable harm). The remaining options 
all involve the violation of some other humans’ negative rights 
to not be harmed or, at the very least, their positive rights to be 
protected from harm. Since options 2-4 plausibly involve vio-
lating the rights of many people while Option 1 only requires 
the rights of a single individual to be violated, Regan would 
likely recommend this course of action, in agreement with wel-
farism. That being said, some other authors have argued that 
Regan has the resources to consistently recommend option 3 
in some limited circumstances (Abbate 2016), but this conse-
quence only follows if we make some significant modifications 
to Regan’s view. In sum, it seems plausible to claim that most 
versions of the animal rights theories would settle on Options 
1 or 2.  
The main contribution of this paper is the observation that a 
virtue ethical perspective significantly disagrees with the op-
tions that are recommend by welfarism and rights-based theo-
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ries. It is true that Option 1 may be said to express some impor-
tant virtues. For example, a truly just individual might choose 
this option because it prevents anyone from being unjustly 
forced to take on a burden in order to benefit some third party. 
But a virtue ethical analysis reveals that an individual who 
chooses Option 1 also suffers from some very important defi-
ciencies in sympathy and compassion. A compassionate moral 
agent should not merely look at the suffering of an individual 
in need and coldly conclude that it must be killed. We may even 
go as far as to say that the individual who simply turns the ly-
canthrope over to be killed is problematically callous.
Option 2 is even less defensible from a virtue ethical per-
spective. This choice likely leads to the greatest number of hu-
mans being killed, and these individuals will be killed indis-
criminately (as the lycanthrope will likely kill many humans 
for entertainment as well as food and will not have the capacity 
to carefully select his victims). This choice therefore expresses 
a complete lack of concern for justice, as well as a lack of com-
passion for the large number of victims that could be spared by 
any of the other remaining options. Additionally, an individual 
choosing to prioritize her own clean hands over the welfare of 
others is not demonstrating courage, but rather is expressing 
a form of cowardice. In short, Option 2 fares the worst from a 
virtue ethical perspective. 
There are, of course, many ethical concerns that could be 
raised about the people who choose options 3 or 4. For exam-
ple, we might plausibly point out that allowing humans to be 
killed (or killing them oneself) to maintain the life of the ly-
canthropic human reveals not only a lack of sympathy towards 
the food-humans, but also a callousness towards human life 
that must be considered vicious. However, I am not convinced 
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that choosing options 3 or 4 necessarily reveals a lack of sym-
pathy or an objectionable amount of callousness. This is largely 
because the lycanthrope does not merely desire human flesh, 
but requires it in order to survive. Once we acknowledge this 
fact, the following question becomes absolutely crucial to this 
discussion: if a morally-considerable being requires the death 
of another morally-considerable being in order to survive, does 
the first necessarily express callousness when taking the life of 
the second? Rosalind Hursthouse answers this question in the 
following way: 
What if I needed meat to survive? That would, of 
course, be a very different situation. No one would 
think of many Africans, situated as they are, as being 
short of compassion solely on the grounds that they ate 
whatever the aid agencies provided. (Hursthouse 2006, 
142). 
If we agree with Hursthouse that one does not necessarily 
express a lack of compassion simply by taking what one needs 
(even the life of another) in order to survive, why wouldn’t the 
same be true of someone who takes the life of another to allow 
a third human to survive? 
This point can be expressed more precisely by consider-
ing the following chain of inference. First, we must observe 
that the ethics of eating animal products is heavily influenced 
by our actual biological, ecological, and agricultural realities. 
Many proponents of ethical veganism would accept that it is 
only because it is possible for humans to thrive on a vegan diet 
that we have any obligation to abstain from animal products. 
If our biological, ecological, or agricultural realities were such 
that a vegan diet and lifestyle was not practically possible, it 
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is plausible to claim that we could eat meat or other animal 
products without exhibiting callousness or a lack of sympathy. 
To claim any alternative is to say that any human who does not 
starve to death or suffer serious malnourishment for the sake 
of others is callous or unsympathetic. It is not uncommon for 
people discussing animal ethics to consider this issue by asking 
what one would do if one were abandoned on an island with 
insufficient sources of plant protein but plenty of wild pigs. It 
does not seem that the people who kill pigs in this situation are 
necessarily being callous or unsympathetic to those animals. 
This intuition is acknowledged by other prominent proponents 
of veganism, such as Mylan Engel (Engel 2000, 873). 
The second step in this chain of inference is to ask what, if 
anything, would change if a third party were to engage in the 
acts of killing on behalf of another person who needed animal 
products in order to survive and thrive. To modify the ‘desert 
island’ example mentioned above, imagine two people strand-
ed on an island with few sources of plant protein but many 
pigs. One of the individuals was injured in whatever horrible 
accident led to their being stranded on this particular island. 
The injured party is also deathly allergic to the one signifi-
cant source of plant protein that grows on the island (a legume 
similar to the peanut). The other individual can consume the 
legumes, and thus has no need of animal protein, but nonethe-
less catches and kills pigs for the injured person to consume 
(but does not consume pig flesh herself). Does this third party 
exhibit a lack of compassion or an objectionable amount of cal-
lousness towards the pigs that are killed to sustain her compa-
triot? It is hard to see how the motivations and dispositions of 
this individual should be any different from the person who 
consumes animal products in order to prevent her own star-
vation. If we have already agreed that imminent starvation or 
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severe malnutrition make it possible to kill an animal for food 
without exhibiting a lack of compassion, then it should not be 
relevant whose starvation or malnutrition is imminent. 
Finally, we have to apply these conclusions to the case of the 
lycanthropic human where it is not pigs being killed to sustain 
a human life, but rather other humans. Does this fact about the 
case imply that the individual who cares for and feeds the ly-
canthropic human necessarily exhibits an objectionable degree 
of callousness, or betrays a problematic lack of sympathy and 
compassion? I suspect that anyone who believes that humans 
deserve a higher moral status than animals (such as Cohen 1986 
or Warren 1986) would answer this question in the affirmative, 
but those who accept some version of the claim that animals 
should be extended moral equality with humans ought to make 
roughly consistent judgments about the individual who kills a 
pig so another may live and the individual who kills a human 
so another may live. At the very least, proponents of animal 
equality should concede that both individuals are very likely to 
express the same virtues and vices. In sum, if it is possible to 
kill a pig to prevent the starvation of another without exhibiting 
callousness, then it should also be possible to kill a human for 
the same motives without exhibiting callousness. 
I think this chain of reasoning serves as a plausible defense 
of the claim that someone could choose options 3 or 4 without 
necessarily exhibiting callousness. Additionally, unlike op-
tions 1 or 2, 3 and 4 both involve the expression of a profound 
sympathy for a living being. When faced with this lycanthropic 
human in need, an individual who chooses 3 or 4 decides to do 
everything possible to find a home for it and provide for its bio-
logical needs. This kind of sympathy and compassion, which 
is a virtue that plays a large role in virtue ethical accounts of 
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animal ethics, is not exhibited by the actions described in either 
Options 1 or 2. 
Furthermore, Option 3 expresses more virtues than Option 
4, as it would take considerable courage to take on the task 
of providing for another creature when doing so will involve 
participating in actions that are ethically suspect. By taking on 
this responsibility oneself, rather than passing it off on some-
one who may not take it as seriously, our protagonist demon-
strates not only courage, but also the willingness to take on dif-
ficult responsibilities and an unwillingness to risk that another 
caregiver will care for the lycanthrope in a less ethical way 
(by, for example, feeding it human meat that was not procured 
humanely). Thus, it seems that a virtuous individual would be 
very likely to ‘go in for’ Option 3 over any of the alternatives.
Ultimately, what should the virtue ethicist say about these 
four options? None of them are perfect, as choosing any of the 
available options involves the expression of at least some vices. 
However, we have found that a person who chooses Option 3 
not only expresses a deep, important form of compassion and 
sympathy for the lycanthropic human, but also expresses a sub-
stantial degree of courage by choosing an option that requires 
taking responsibility and making difficult decisions. After all, 
it will prove very challenging for a truly compassionate person 
to care for the lycanthropic human. In order to express a suf-
ficient amount of compassion for the humans that will be used 
as food, the chooser of Option 3 is essentially taking on the 
obligation to experiment with a number food alternatives and 
thus to try to find a diet that will sustain the lycanthrope with 
the minimal loss of human life. This may involve paying for 
regular health care for the lycanthrope, purchasing a variety 
of expensive alternative foods and supplements, and closely 
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monitoring the health and well-being of the cannibalistic com-
panion. If it is truly determined that this being cannot survive 
and flourish without food derived from humans, then the per-
son who chooses Option 3 must work hard to acquire the food-
humans in the most humane way possible. None of these tasks 
will be easy, and accepting a responsibility to perform them 
expresses a considerable amount of courage.
Even though the person selecting Option 3 may be deficient 
in a sense of justice, it seems very plausible to claim that we can 
understand why a compassionate, sensitive, caring, and coura-
geous person would decide to begin a companionship relation-
ship with the lycanthropic human. This finding has profound 
implications for the problem of carnivorous companionship.
From Lycanthropes to Cats
The fictional scenario I just considered at length is closely 
analogous to adoption of a feline that needs a home. If it is 
made known to someone that a cat does not have a home nor a 
human companion to care for it, the four options below exhaust 
the practically available options:
Option 1: Kill the cat (either directly or by restraining 
it until it dies of malnutrition).
Option 2: Release the cat and leave it to its own devices 
(which will certainly involve the death of many birds, 
reptiles, and rodents). 
Option 3: Adopt the cat and work to acquire the most 
humanely harvested animal products for it.
Option 4: Turn it over to a humane society, a foster 
home, or another individual who will care for it.
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Note, once again, that I am ignoring the fifth option of feed-
ing the cat food derived from the corpses of naturally-dying 
animals, as it is not likely that the current number of cats in the 
world who need a home could, practically speaking, be sus-
tained on this source of food. 
Just like in the case of the lycanthropic human, we can see 
that a compassionate, sensitive person would not consider Op-
tions 1 or 2. We can also see how someone may express a con-
siderable amount of courage by choosing 3, which involves 
taking on the responsibility to work as hard to possible to care 
for the cat, monitor its health, and seek the most humane ani-
mal products possible (rather than standard factory-farmed cat 
food), including as much vegan cat food as is practically pos-
sible, for it to consume. While such a person would arguably 
express some kind of a deficiency in terms of the virtue of jus-
tice, Option 3 seems to express more virtues and fewer vices 
than any of the other available options. 
The important conclusion to focus on at this point is that 
a virtue ethical approach would give a very different solution 
to the Vegetarian’s Dilemma than would welfarist and animal 
rights approaches. Whereas these other approaches deny that it 
would be ethically acceptable to begin a companionship rela-
tionship with a carnivore, the virtue ethical approach shows us 
that the very same virtuous dispositions that might lead some-
one to transition towards a vegan lifestyle (specifically sympa-
thy and compassion) could also lead them to commit to caring 
for a carnivorous animal in need. Thus, from a virtue ethical 
perspective, veganism and carnivorous companionship are not 




http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
Proponents of welfarism or the animal rights perspective 
will likely dismiss these considerations on the grounds that a 
focus on compassion and other virtuous dispositions may mis-
lead us or otherwise prevent us from making correct ethical 
judgments. However, my purpose in this paper is not to refute 
welfarism or rights-based approaches any more than it is to of-
fer a sustained defense of virtue-based approaches. Rather, my 
goal has been to shed light on the fact that an often-neglected 
perspective on animal ethics seems to provide a plausible and 
unique account of how the Vegetarian’s Dilemma could be re-
solved. 
Works cited
Abbate, Cheryl. 2016. “How to Help when It Hurts: The Prob-
lem of Assisting Victims of Injustice.” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 47 (2): 142-170.
Cohen, Carl. 1986. “The Case for the Use of Animals in Bio-
medical Research.” The New England Journal of Medi-
cine 315: 865-870.
Donaldson, S and W Kymlicka. 2011. Zoopolis: A political the-
ory of animal rights. New York: Oxford University Press.
Engel, Mylan. 2000. “The Immorality of Eating Meat.” In The 
Moral Life, edited by L. Pojman, 856-859. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York/Oxford. 
Gray CM, RK Sellon, and LM Freeman. 2005. “Nutritional 
Adequacy of Two Vegan Diets for Cats.” Journal of the 




http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 2000. “Applying Virtue Ethics to our 
Treatment of the Other Animals.” In The practice of vir-
tue: Classic and contemporary readings in virtue ethics, 
edited by J. Welchman, 136-155. Hackett: Cambridge.  
Kanakubo K, AJ Fascetti, and JA Larsen. 2015.” Assessment 
of Protein and Amino Acid Concentrations and Labeling 
Adequacy of Commercial Vegetarian Diets Formulated 
for Dogs and Cats.” Journal of the American Veterinary 
Medical Association 247 (4): 385-392.
McPherson, Tristram. 2014. “A Case for Ethical Vegan-
ism.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (6): 677-703.
Merriam, Garrett. 2008. Virtue ethics and the moral signifi-
cance of animals. Doctoral dissertation, Rice University.
Merriam, Garrett. 2012. “Virtue, Vice and Vivisection.” In The 
Ethics of Animal Research: Exploring the Controversy, 
edited by JR Garrett, 125-146. MIT Press: Cambridge. 
Norcross, Alastair. 2004. “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eat-
ing Meat and Marginal Cases.” Philosophical Perspec-
tives 18 (1): 229-245.
Nussbaum, Martha. 1988. Non-Relative Virtues: an Aristote-
lian Approach.” Midwest studies in philosophy 13 (1): 32-
53.
Quinn, Warren. 1989. “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: 
The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.” The Philosophical 
Review 98 (3): 287-312.
Patrick J. Clipsham
24
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. University of 
California Press: Berkeley.
Rothgerber, Hank. 2014. “Carnivorous Cats, Vegetarian Dogs, 
and the Resolution of the Vegetarian’s Dilemma.” An-
throzoös 27 (4): 485-498.
Singer, Peter. 1995. Animal Liberation. Random House: New 
York.
Warren, Mary-Anne. 1986. “Difficulties with the Strong Ani-
mal Rights Position.” Between the Species 2 (4): 163-173. 
